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Abstract – Although in July 1997 UK resident tax-exempt shareholders lost the right to repayment of tax credits
on dividends paid by UK resident companies, they could continue to receive tax credit repayments in respect of
dividends received from Irish resident companies - many of which are listed on the London Stock Exchange.  In
July 1997 the rate of tax credit on Irish companies’ dividends was 21%.  This was reduced to 11% in December
1997, and the right to tax credit repayments was abolished in January 1999.
We obtain insights into the incentives and behaviour of tax-exempt investors in response to these changes in the
relative ‘tax attractiveness’ of investments in Irish resident companies over UK resident companies.  In
particular, we examine the trade off between the availability of dividend tax credit repayment and the sum of
transaction costs and portfolio restructuring costs.  In addition, we examine the behaviour of stock price and
trading volume of UK resident companies’ stocks around ex-dividend days in order to provide a basis of
comparison to, and to extend, the work of Bell and Jenkinson (2002).
We conclude as follows: (i) only at its highest rate, 21%, was the level of dividend tax credit on Irish companies’
dividends sufficient to induce changes in UK tax-exempt shareholders’ investment strategies; (ii) implied total
expected investor costs in dividend capture are in the order of 2.6%, consistent with the costing of uncertainty
over ex-dividend price and the efficacy of anti-avoidance legislation; (iii) tax-exempt shareholders were the
marginal investors in UK resident companies prior to the July 1997, consistent with the findings of Bell and
Jenkinson (2002); and (iv) tax induced dividend capture of UK companies’ dividends is evidenced in trading
volume patterns.
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31.  Introduction
The payment of dividends represents an important, predictable interaction between companies and
shareholders.  Numerous effects or ‘non-effects’ have been attributed to dividend policy.  Modigliani
and Miller (1963) demonstrate that, under certain market assumptions, firm value is independent of
dividend policy, though unanticipated changes can impose tax and adjustment costs on shareholders.
Conversely, in a setting characterised by information asymmetry between mangers and shareholders,
dividend policy can increase firm value by reducing agency costs (Rozeff, 1982) and revealing
managers’ inside information to the capital markets (Ross, 1977).  Other value relevant effects have
been attributed to differential investor level marginal tax rates as between dividend income and
realised gains, and to tick size, settlement costs, uncertainty in ex-dividend prices and market
microstructure.  These effects are not wholly mutually exclusive and, therefore, one or more of them
can interfere in and confound attempts to examine any other in isolation.  For example, a hypothesised
tax-induced effect may not occur because of the existences of transaction costs, or the cumulation of a
number of tax changes which are together sufficient to overcome transactions costs may give rise to
spurious empirical detection and value overstatement in respect of one of the changes.
In a market valuation context, investor level tax considerations are only important when they impose
costs or benefits on the ‘price setting’ or marginal shareholder and, therefore, influence their pricing
decisions.  In the UK, institutional investors dominate the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in terms of
the volume and value of shares owned and traded; and, more importantly, tax-exempt institutional
investors dominate in terms of price setting (Bell and Jenkinson, 2002).
This paper investigates a change in the dividend-related cash flows accruing to tax-exempt
institutional investors.  Although the UK Finance (No.2) Act 1997 abolished the right of UK resident
tax exempt shareholders to claim repayment of tax credits on dividends received from UK resident
companies on or after 2nd July 1997, such shareholders could continue to receive tax credit repayments
on a sub-group of UK listed companies.  Under the terms of the UK - Republic of Ireland Double
Taxation Convention in operation as at July 1997, tax exempt UK pension funds and UK insurance
company tax exempt pension businesses (together hereafter referred to as ‘TEPIC investors’)
continued to obtain tax credit repayments on dividends received from companies resident in the
Republic of Ireland – many of which were (and, indeed, still are) listed on the London Stock
Exchange.1,2 This state of affairs continued only until 31st December 1998, the double taxation
                                                 
1 Similarly, under Irish domestic legislation, Irish resident pension funds could also obtain repayments of tax
credits from Irish resident companies.  The general repayment of dividend tax credits to tax exempt investors
was abolished from Irish domestic legislation in April 1999.
2 The Irish Stock Exchange Ltd was established following the December 1995 demerger of The International
Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Ltd.  Until that point, most Irish companies
had dual listing on the Dublin and London Stock Exchanges (Mulligan, 1996).  In order to alleviate the ‘market
4convention having been revised by an amending protocol dated 4th November 1998.  Consequently,
three tax regimes can be identified as follows:
(i) prior to 2nd July 1997 TEPIC investors in both UK resident and Irish resident companies
were entitled to the repayment of tax credits;
(ii) between 2nd July 1997 and 31st December 1998 TEPIC investors were entitled to the
repayment of tax credits on dividends received only from Irish resident companies (an
Irish dividend tax credit rate change during this period allows it to be further sub-divided
into the periods 2nd July 1997 to 2nd December 1997, inclusive, and 3rd December 1997 to
31st December 1998, inclusive); and
(iii) after the 1st January 1999 TEPIC investors were not entitled to a repayment of tax credit
upon dividend from either UK resident or Irish resident companies.
Observing changes in investor behaviour as between the above periods can provide insights into
investor incentives, expectations and attitudes concerning dividends.  In order to abstract from
signalling and agency considerations we examine ‘ex-dividend’ day price and volume changes,
developing and testing a number of hypotheses concerning stock price and trading volume changes in
response to variations in the availability and level of dividend tax credit repayments.  These
hypotheses link the relative ‘tax attractiveness’ of investment in Irish resident (as compared to UK
resident) companies over the periods set out above and the actions of TEPIC investors, and are
designed to obtain insights into the incentives to and behaviours of such investors.  In particular, we
examine the trade off between the availability of dividend tax credit repayment and transaction costs.
Further, we examine the behaviour of stock price and trading volume of UK resident companies’
stocks around ex-dividend days in order to provide a basis of comparison and to extend the work of
Bell and Jenkinson.
The paper’s main contributions can be summarised as follows: (i) the development and testing of tax-
based hypotheses over a period containing several taxation changes; (ii) the examination of trading
volume across a number of periods where there are clear variations in the expected profitability of
dividend capture trading; and (iii) the development of a model which can explain the propensity of
dividend capture trading activity in terms of transaction costs.  The potential for impact of
                                                                                                                                                         
presence’ concerns of some Irish companies a ‘special association agreement’ allowed dual resident companies
the option to maintain their dual listing status - and many of the larger Irish companies continue to hold such
dual listing status (Lucey, 2001).  Irish firms seeking an initial quotation post December 1995, however, had to
choose between the two markets.
5confounding, unrelated changes to market and trading arrangements is mitigated in that the period
over which the dividend taxation changes considered in the paper occurred, and, therefore, the sample
period, are relatively short.
Our results can be summarised as follows.  First, TEPIC investors appear to be the marginal investors
in Irish resident shares only during the period when Irish dividend tax credit repayments were
available at the rate of 21% (as compared to zero per cent for dividends from UK resident companies).
This result is consistent with changes in the relative rates of tax credit repayment between UK and
Irish resident companies inducing a change in TEPIC investors’ strategies, i.e., evidence of a dividend
clientele forming and subsequently dissipating.  Second, the absence of evidence suggesting TEPIC
investors where the marginal investors in Irish resident shares when Irish dividend tax credit
repayments were available at the rate of only 11% (again, as compared to zero per cent for UK
resident companies) is consistent with TEPIC investors’ transaction costs being of sufficient
magnitude to outweigh the now reduced potential tax benefits of holding shares of Irish resident
companies, and with such investors seeking to maximise after tax returns rather than tax benefits.
Third, our model of transaction and portfolio restructuring costs imply expected transaction costs in
the order of 2.6% which is higher than the ‘round trip’ transactions costs suggested by James (2000).
This finding is consistent with the expected costs of deviation from an otherwise optimal portfolio for
the purposes of dividend (and related tax credit) capture being significant, uncertainty over ex-
dividend price and the efficacy of anti-avoidance legislation which imposes additional costs by
requiring a minimum holding period if dividend tax credit capture to be fully effective.  Fourth, for
UK resident companies, TEPIC investors appear to be the marginal investor prior to the abolition of
tax credit repayments - consistent with the findings of Bell and Jenkinson.  Fifth, we observe patterns
in trading volume consistent with tax induced dividend capture for the UK resident companies (but
data considerations prevent a similar analysis for Irish resident companies).
This remainder of this paper proceeds as follows:  the next section discusses the relevant legislation
and illustrates the impact of the changes on the taxation of dividends; previous work examining both
price changes and volumes traded around the ex-dividend day are discussed in the third section; the
fourth section sets out methodology, hypotheses, data source, definition of variables; the results are
presented and discussed in the fifth section; and the final section concludes.
62.  Relevant legislation
This section summarises the relevant tax legislation covering the repayment of dividend tax credit and
related anti-avoidance legislation in the context of the UK - Republic of Ireland Double Taxation
Convention.
During the early part of the period under review, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom both
operated a partial imputation system regulating the interaction of the corporate and personal tax
systems with respect to dividends.  The key features of both countries’ systems were identical.3  A
company paying a (net) dividend was required to pay advance corporation tax (ACT) to the Inland
Revenue/Revenue equal to the product of the lower rate of income tax and the gross dividend, where
the gross dividend is equal to the net dividend plus the ACT.  Shareholders received the net dividend
plus an imputed tax credit (‘tax credit’) which together equalled the gross dividend.  If the
shareholder’s marginal tax rate on dividend income (‘marginal rate’) was equal to the lower or basic
rate of income tax, no further action was required.  If the shareholder’s marginal rate was greater than
the lower rate, an additional payment, by the shareholder, was due to the tax authorities – being equal
to the amount of the gross dividend multiplied by the excess of the higher rate over the basic rate.  If,
on the other hand, the shareholder’s marginal rate was less than the lower rate of tax they could obtain
a repayment equal to the amount of the gross dividend multiplied by the difference between their
marginal rate and the lower rate of tax.  Hence, a tax-exempt investor could reclaim an amount
equivalent to the dividend tax credit in full.
After 1st July 1997, however, the right of TEPIC investors to obtain repayment of the tax credit on
dividends received from UK resident companies was abolished.  The ability of tax-exempt investors
resident in Ireland to obtain repayment of the tax credit on dividends received from companies
resident in the Republic of Ireland continued until the abolition of dividend tax credits in April 1999.
Intriguingly, though, during the period 2nd July 1997 to 31st December 1998, TEPIC investors could
continue to obtain repayment of the tax credits on dividends paid by companies resident in the
Republic of Ireland, under the terms of the UK - Republic of Ireland Double Taxation Convention then
in operation (although no similar right existed under UK domestic legislation).  One objective of
taxation conventions is the avoidance of discrimination between taxpayers of the two contracting
states.  Post July 1997, Irish domestic legislation continued to allow repayment of tax credits on
dividends from companies resident in the Republic of Ireland to tax exempt investors similarly
                                                 
3 This version of the UK imputation system was abolished by the Finance Act of 1999 with effect from 6 April
1999.
7resident.  The convention extended that right to TEPIC investing in those same Republic of Ireland
companies - thereby ensuring comparable treatment.4
The availability of tax credit repayments to tax exempt shareholders may generate a preference for
dividend income over capital growth.5  Indeed, one of the justifications of the July 1997 change in the
UK was to relieve the pressure on companies to pay dividends in order to satisfy the preferences of
tax-exempt shareholders: ‘The present system of tax credits encourages companies to pay out
dividends rather than reinvest their profits’ (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1997).  If non-tax factors
lead tax-exempt shareholders to hold low dividend yield portfolios, such shareholders may attempt to
increase dividend income by temporarily altering their portfolios to include higher dividend yielding
shares.  For example, purchasing and then selling a high dividend yield share around its ex-dividend
date would provide additional dividend income whilst minimising the costs of temporary portfolio
imbalance.  Anti-avoidance legislation, however, exists in both the Republic of Ireland and the United
Kingdom designed to thwart the tax benefit of such ‘bond washing’ activities.6,7  When a tax-exempt
investor purchases a share and within a month and sells it (both transactions being at ‘current market
price’), and during the period of ownership the share turns ex-dividend, then the amount of available
tax credit repayment is reduced by ‘an appropriate amount’.8  This legislation, however, was in place
in both the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom throughout the period under examination in
this paper and, therefore, does not affect the relative ‘tax attractiveness’ of dividend income during the
three phases of the identified natural experiment.
                                                 
4 The entitlement to repayment was given by paragraph 2(b), which originally read as follows: ‘A resident of a
Contracting State who receives dividends from a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State
shall, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph and provided he is the beneficial owner of
the dividends, be entitled to the tax credit in respect thereof to which an individual resident in that other
Contracting State would have been entitled had he received those dividends, and to the payment of any excess of
that tax credit over his liability to tax in that other Contracting State.’  Sub-paragraph (c) referred to above
provides that the entitlement to repayment is not available where the beneficial owner controls 10% or more of
the voting power in the company paying the dividend.  In the amended treaty, the original paragraph 2 was
deleted.
5 There may be non-tax reasons for such a preference.  For example, Section 34 of the Pensions Act 1995
empowers trustees to make investments, but the Act does not define the term ‘investment’.  Case law provides
some clarification, although there is still uncertainty.  In Re Wragg (1919) 2 Ch. 55 p.64, ‘investment’ is defined
narrowly as the purchase of property ‘in order to be held for the sake of the income it will yield’ (presumably in
contrast to trading where the motive may be to purchase an asset with the expectation of a subsequent resale at a
higher price).  Although the courts have recognised new approaches to investment ‘putting the emphasis in
investment on the making of capital profit at the expense of investment yield’ (Marson v. Morton [1986] 1 WLR
1343 at page 1350) the ‘cautious approach must be to adopt the strict interpretation set out in Re Wragg in the
absence of a more definite definition’ (Nabarro Nathanson, 2000).
6 The term ‘bond washing’ is generic to all activities that attempt to ‘wash’ an underlying security free of the
related coupon or dividend payment.
7 In the Republic of Ireland, the legislation is contained in Section 750 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.
The corresponding provisions in the United Kingdom are found in Section 733 of the Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1988.
8 The reduction being given by:
  date  dividend-ex  current''    todate  dividend-ex  previous  from  period
  purchase  of  date  beforeday    one    todate  dividend-ex  previous  from  period
  credit    tax  potential  max. ×
8The tax credit rates applicable to dividends from both Republic of Ireland resident and United
Kingdom resident companies varied over the period under review and are set out in Panel A of Table
1.  Panel B of Table 1 summarises the periods of availability of tax credit repayment to tax-exempt
investors, as discussed above.
3.  Previous literature
3.1.  Ex-dividend price behaviour
In addition to the amount of dividend, a number of other factors have been identified in the literature
as potentially influencing the level of the ex-dividend day fall in share price.  In a risk-neutral world
without taxes, and abstracting from transaction costs, settlement costs and other market imperfections,
the drop in share price when a share turns ex-dividend should equal the dividend paid to shareholders.
In other words, the ratio of the price drop to the dividend paid, often referred to as the drop off ratio
(DOR), should be equal to one.  Following the seminal work of Campbell and Beranek (1955), many
empirical studies have examined whether or not this hypothesis holds.  Elton and Gruber (1970) report
that the price drop is more often than not less than the dividend paid and argue that the DOR will only
be equal to one if the effective tax rates on dividends and capital gains are the same.  They argue that
shareholders can choose to sell a share when it is cum-dividend and forego the dividend payment,
generating the following cash flows:
( )ptGt PPTP −− −− 11 (1)
where the ex-dividend date of the share is at time t; 1−tP  is the share price at close on the trading day
before t; pP  is the price originally paid for the share; and GT  is the rate of taxation on capital gains
which the investor faces.
Alternatively, the shareholder may choose to sell the share when it is ex-dividend and generate cash
flows, under an imputation system, as follows:
( ) ( )
( )ACT
I
ptGt T
T
DPPTP
−
−
+−−
1
1
(2)
9where tP  is the share price on the ex-dividend day; D is the amount of dividend paid, IT  is the rate of
taxation on dividend income and TACT is the rate of imputation tax (equal to the basic rate of tax during
the period analysed).  Investors will be indifferent between selling cum- or ex-dividend provided
expressions (1) and (2) are equal.  Assuming this condition, and rearranging the resulting equation, the
DOR is given by:
( ) ( )
( )( )ACTG
Itt
TT
T
D
PP
−−
−
=
−−
11
11 (3)
and, hence, the DOR will equal one if and only if ACTGACTGI TTTTT −+= .  Under a classical tax
system, such as that in the US, the DOR will equal one if and only if IT = GT .
Lakonsihok and Vermaelen (1983), Eades et al. (1984), Poterba and Summers (1984), Kaplanis
(1986), Barclay (1987), Fedenia and Grammatikos (1993) and Lasfer (1995), amongst others, also
suggest that differential taxation may explain a DOR of less than one.  If investors’ tax rates are not
homogenous, however, arbitrage may occur as investors with relatively favourable income tax rates
purchase shares cum-dividend from investors who face heavier income tax rates.  If this arbitrage
occurs the DOR will, in part, reflect the transaction costs of these short-term investors.
Other posited explanations for DORs different from one include tick size, settlement costs, uncertainty
in ex-dividend prices and market microstructure effects.  Bali and Hite (1998) argue that if the
dividend payment is not a multiple of the current tick size, then the share price cannot change by the
exact amount of the dividend and contend that the ex-dividend price fall will be rounded down to the
nearest tick size, tending to deflate the DOR.  Lasfer (1995) points out that prior to July 1994 the
London Stock Exchange operated a fixed-settlement system under which investors, if they purchased
shares at the start of the settlement period, did not have to settle for two weeks.  A large proportion of
shares tended to go ex-dividend on the first day of the settlement period, hence if an investor
purchased a share cum-dividend (at the end of the previous settlement period) they would settle two
weeks earlier than if they were to purchase the share ex-dividend.  Frank and Jaganathan (1998)
examine ex-dividend day pricing in Hong Kong, where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed,
and still find that the DOR ratio tends to be less than one, positing market microstructure as an
explanation.
Under the imputation system, tax-exempt investors able to reclaim imputed tax credits upon dividends
should prefer dividends to capital gains - and hence, we argue that the DOR (based on the net
10
dividend), if such tax-exempt investors are the marginal investors and abstracting from all non-tax
imperfections, should be greater than one.
3.2.  Tax-exempt investors
The prominence of tax-exempt investors, and particularly pension funds, is evidenced by the
significance of their aggregate holdings (22.1% of total UK traded equity was held by pension funds
as at 31st December, 1997).  The results of Bell and Jenkinson support the hypothesis that tax-exempt
investors are the marginal investors in UK stocks, especially stocks with high dividend yield.  Absent
transactions costs and portfolio adjustment considerations, we would expect increased activity by
TEPIC investors switching from UK resident to Irish resident stocks during the period 2nd July 1997 to
the 31st December 1998, since, to this investor group over this period, dividends paid by Irish resident
companies would be worth more than dividends paid by UK resident companies.  Further, if TEPIC
investors were the marginal investors in Irish resident stocks throughout the period, a significant
decrease in the value of the dividend, i.e. a fall in the DOR, should be observed following the abolition
of the tax credit on dividends from Irish resident companies.
Switches in investor holdings performed in order to capture the taxation-based benefits need only have
been temporary, since TEPIC investors would only need to hold shares in the Irish resident company
for a month including the date when they went ex-dividend in order to capture differential benefit in
full (i.e., not reduced by anti-avoidance, ‘anti-bond washing’ legislation).  A change in portfolio to
capture these tax effects may, however, have required investors to deviate from their optimal portfolio,
hence, potentially increasing their exposure to risk, ceteris paribus.  This switch may only have been
temporary, but since the price at which the investor could sell ex-dividend (at a point a month or more
since purchase in order to enjoy the full differential benefit) was uncertain, the risk involved was
further increased.  Trading also, as always, would have incurred transactions costs.  Hence, rational
investors would only have traded to capture dividends if the expected differential taxation-based
benefits exceeded the expected costs of additional risk and transaction costs involved.
3.3.  Ex-dividend trading volume
Michaely and Vila (1995) posit that examining ex-dividend pricing alone may be insufficient to
identify investors’ tax preferences and suggest that changes in trading volume around the ex-dividend
day may provide further information beyond that contained in prices.  They argue that it is not possible
to identify from prices whether investors face homogenous or heterogenous effective tax rates, and
suggest that trading volume increases significantly around the ex-dividend day, reflecting ‘dividend
capture’, and that it will increase further as investors face increasingly different preferences for
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dividends or capital gains.  Both transaction costs and potential increases in risk (due to temporarily
moving from an optimal portfolio) are unavoidable costs involved in switching shares to capture tax
credits.  As discussed above, if the expected costs of switching outweigh the potential benefits
investors will not trade, and hence the higher the transactions costs and the increase in systematic risk,
the less attractive dividend capture becomes.  Michaely and Vila (1995) find that both transaction
costs and risk significantly impact on the volume of shares traded around the ex-dividend day, whereas
their impact on prices is found, by these authors, to be less significant.
Li (2002) reports that excess trading volume increases with dividend yield.  Li also examines the
impact of different tax regimes and argues that ‘tax regime changes should have an impact on ex-
dividend excess trading volume because they cause changes in the relative taxation of dividends and
capital gains’ and goes on to say ‘the gains to exchanging tax burdens among investors with different
tax status increases [decreases] and this increases [decreases] trading volume around the ex-dividend
days.’  The difference between the effective tax rates for dividends and capital gains increased in the
US following an increase in income tax rates in 1993 and a decrease in capital gains tax rates in 1997.
Li expected to find an accompanying increase in trading volume reflecting the increased potential for
tax arbitrage but, instead, found a decrease.  He contends that this may be due to a decrease in
dividend yield, suggesting firms may have changed their dividend policy following the tax regime
changes.
The removal of the tax credits, first in the United Kingdom and then in the Republic of Ireland,
decreased the extent of differential taxation between capital gains and dividends over time.  The
decrease in potential benefits was likely to discourage the extent of dividend capture activity following
the removal of the tax credits, and hence it is expected that the extent of excess trading volume around
the ex-dividend day has on the whole decreased over the periods examined.
Foregoing discussion concerning trading volume around ex-dividend days must be compounded by
consideration of the effects of applicable anti-avoidance legislation.  As set out in Section 2, such
legislation was in operation in both the Republic of Ireland and the UK throughout the period of this
study – denying full repayment of dividend tax credit (where available) to investors if they did not
hold the underlying share for one month or more.  For example, purchase of a share on its last day
cum-dividend and sale on the ex-dividend date would result, assuming successful operation of the anti
avoidance legislation, in a very small proportion of the associated dividend tax credit to be reclaimed.
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4.  Methodology, hypotheses, data source, variables and models
We examine the market valuation of dividends and trading volumes around ex-dividend regimes for
UK and Irish companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange over the following four tax regimes:
i) Prior to the 2nd July 1997 – when TEPIC investors in both UK and Irish resident
companies were able to reclaim the tax credit associated with those companies’ dividends.
In the following, this period is designated period ‘Both’.
ii) From 2nd July 1997 to 2nd December 1997 (inclusive) – when TEPIC investors were able
to reclaim the tax credit associated with dividends from Irish resident companies at a rate
of 21% on the gross dividend, but were unable to make any such claim in respect of
dividends from UK resident companies.  This period is designated ‘Irish21’.
iii) From 3rd December 1997 to 31st December 1998 (inclusive) – when TEPIC investors were
able to reclaim the tax credit associated with dividends from Irish resident companies at a
rate of 11% on the gross dividend, but were unable to make any such claim in respect of
dividends from UK resident companies.  This period is designated ‘Irish11’.
iv) Following 31st December 1998 – when TEPIC investors were not able to reclaim any tax
credit in respect of dividends paid by either UK or Irish resident companies.  This period
is designated ‘Neither’.
4.1.  Price behaviour
This sub-section commences with the formulation of regression models to explain ex-dividend price
behaviour.  We formulate two primary regression models in respect of each of Irish and UK resident
companies’ dividend events - an unscaled and a scaled model - and in each case perform the
estimations using both unadjusted and market-adjusted prices.  The section goes on to formulate
hypotheses concerning the models’ coefficients.
In line with Elton and Gruber (1970) we compare the drop in share price on the ex-dividend day with
the net dividend paid as follows:
ti
titi
D
PP
,
,1, −− (4)
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where, for company i going ex-dividend at time t, Pi,t-1 and Pi,t are, respectively, the closing prices per
share on the cum-dividend and ex-dividend days, and Di,t is the net dividend per share paid.
If the drop in share price is equal to the net dividend paid, the DOR, as per expression (4), will equal
1.  The DOR, in effect, indicates the value of the dividend to the marginal investor in the stock.  If
dividends are tax-advantaged to capital gains, which, indeed, they were for TEPIC investors up to 2nd
July 1997 in respect of both UK and Irish resident stocks, and further up to 31st December 1998 in
respect of Irish resident stocks, and TEPIC investors are the marginal investors, we would expect the
DOR to be greater than one during the periods of tax-advantage.9  Although we report the DORs, there
are methodological problems with the statistic as it is not normally distributed and is distorted by very
small net dividend payments.  An alternative procedure to identify the relationship between the price
drop and the dividend is to examine the slope coefficient, iβ , in the following regression:
itiititi DPP εβ +=−− ,,1, (5)
where iε  is a stochastic error term.
Following Frank and Jaganathan (1998), who argue that a significantly negative intercept is evidence
of a market-microstructure effect, we allow for an intercept as follows:
itititi DPP εβα ++=−− ,,1, (6)
Finally, in order to examine whether or not the market value of dividends has changed over the three
periods of our study (periods Both, Irish and Neither) we include period slope dummies and estimate,
via OLS, the following augmented model:
( )
( ) ( ) itiIRISHtiIRISH
tiBOTHtititi
DIRISHDIRISH
DBOTHDPP
εββ
ββα
+⋅+⋅+
⋅++=−−
,11,21
,,,1,
1121
(7)
where BOTH is a zero-one dummy, equal to one when the ex-dividend day falls in the period prior to
2nd July, 1997; IRISH21 is a zero-one dummy, equal to one when the ex-dividend day falls in the
period from 2nd July, 1997 to 2nd December 1997 (inclusive); and IRISH11 is a zero-one dummy, equal
                                                 
9 Abstracting from other factors, as discussed earlier, which may affect the DOR.
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to one when the ex-dividend day falls in the period from 3rd December 1997 to 31st December 1998
(inclusive).  The ‘base case’ of the model, is, therefore, for ex-dividend days falling in the period
following the 31st December 1998.
This estimation is performed separately for dividend events associated with Irish resident firms (‘the
unscaled Irish model’) and those associated with UK resident firms (‘the unscaled UK model’).  In the
UK model, there is no effect from changing rates of Irish dividend tax credit, so the estimated model is
simplified to:
( )
( ) itiIRISH
tiBOTHtititi
DIRISH
DBOTHDPP
εβ
ββα
+⋅+
⋅++=−−
,
,,,1,
(8)
where IRISH is a zero-one dummy, equal to one when the ex-dividend day falls in the period from 2nd
July, 1997 to 31st December 1998 (inclusive).  In discussing the UK data and the UK model, therefore,
we designate ‘period Irish’ to be from 2nd July 1997 to 31st December 1998 – when TEPIC investors
were able to reclaim the tax credit associated with dividends from Irish resident companies at a rate of
either 21% or 11% on the gross dividend, but were unable to make any such claim in respect of
dividends from UK resident companies.
We also estimated scaled forms of the above models to mitigate any heteroscedasticity concerns.
i
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for dividend events associated with Irish resident firms (‘the scaled Irish model’), and
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for dividend events associated with UK resident firms (‘the scaled UK model’), where, in each, the
variables are as previously defined.
We estimate each of these models using both unadjusted and market-adjusted prices10, making the
market adjustment as follows:
tmtitititi RPPP ,,1,,, β−−= (11)
where Rm,t is the return on the market on the ex-dividend day, as proxied by the return on the Financial
Times All Shares Index, and βi,t is the equity beta of company i as estimated using the market model
and daily returns data over the -105 to –6 days prior to ex-dividend day t.  Bell and Jenkinson use
monthly returns in calculating equity betas, in order to overcome problems with thin trading, whereas
we choose to adopt the Scholes-Williams (1977) adjustment.  In order to use monthly data to compute
the equity beta it is necessary to use returns from a considerably longer period than is the case if daily
returns are used – over which longer period there is greater chance that the risk characteristics of the
company may have changed and, hence, a greater chance that the equity beta may be biased.
If TEPIC investors in Irish resident stocks were the marginal investors during periods Both, Irish21
and Irish11, then we would expect each of BOTHβ , 21IRISHβ and 11IRISHβ  to be significantly greater
than zero in the Irish models (since the dividend would be worth significantly more to the tax-exempt
pension fund investor prior to the removal of the tax-credit).  If such investors were not normally the
marginal investors in Irish resident firms, but were the marginal investors during the second and third
periods (periods Irish21 and Irish 11) - when TEPIC investors could have been attracted to Irish
resident companies in order to capture the tax-credit, which was no longer available in respect of UK
resident companies, we would expect 21IRISHβ and 11IRISHβ  to be significantly greater than zero, but
not BOTHβ .  If neither BOTHβ , 21IRISHβ  nor 11IRISHβ  are significantly different from zero, we would
conclude that TEPIC investors did not take the opportunity to capture the tax credit by investing in
Irish resident stocks and/or they were not the marginal investors at any time during the period under
analysis.  Finally, whether or not BOTHβ  is significantly greater than zero, if 21IRISHβ  is significantly
greater than zero whilst 11IRISHβ  is not, we would conclude that TEPIC investors acted to capture
dividends and associated tax credits during period Irish21, but not during Irish11; and, further, that
                                                 
10 We report the results based on market-adjusted prices in the next section.  Results based on unadjusted prices
are not qualitatively different for the Irish models.  For the UK models, slight differences in results based on
unadjusted prices in comparison to the main reported results are disclosed by way of footnote in the next section.
Full results based on unadjusted prices are available from the authors.
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dividend capture was perceived to be worthwhile with a dividend tax credit rate of 21% on gross
dividend, but not when the tax credit rate was 11% - i.e., we may deduce some bounds for total
transactions and portfolio restructuring costs as expected by these investors.
If our results for the UK model are to support those of Bell and Jenkinson, we would deduce that tax-
exempt investors were the marginal investors in UK resident stocks and that BOTHβ  should be
significantly greater than zero (since the dividend would be worth significantly more to the TEPIC
investor prior to the removal of the tax-credit).  Further, the coefficient IRISHβ  should not be
significantly greater than zero as TEPIC investors in UK resident stocks could not reclaim the tax-
credit during period Irish.
Our hypotheses are, therefore, as follows:
Hypothesis 1. TEPIC investors were the marginal investors in Irish resident stocks quoted on the
LSE prior to the removal of the tax credit for such stocks on the 31st December
1998.  As a result BOTHβ , 21IRISHβ  and 11IRISHβ  are all significantly greater than
zero in the Irish models.
Hypothesis 2. TEPIC investors were the marginal investors in Irish resident stocks quoted on the
LSE prior to the reduction in dividend tax credit rate for such stocks from 21% to
11% on 3rd December 1997.  As a result BOTHβ  and 21IRISHβ  are significantly
greater than zero and 11IRISHβ  is not significantly greater than zeros.
Hypothesis 3. TEPIC investors were not normally the marginal investors in Irish resident stocks
quoted on the LSE prior to 2nd July 1997, but were the marginal investors during the
period 2nd July 1997 to 31st December, 1998 in order to capture the preferential
treatment, with respect to the tax credit, afforded to investment in Irish resident
companies.  As a result 21IRISHβ  and 11IRISHβ  are significantly greater than zero in
the Irish models, but BOTHβ  is not.
Hypothesis 4. TEPIC investors were not normally the marginal investors in Irish resident stocks
quoted on the LSE prior to 2nd July 1997or after 2nd December 1997, but were the
marginal investors during the period 2nd July 1997 to 2nd December, 1997 in order
to capture the preferential treatment, with respect to the tax credit at 21%, afforded
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to investment in Irish resident companies.  As a result 21IRISHβ  is significantly
greater than zero in the Irish models, but BOTHβ  and 11IRISHβ  are not.
Hypothesis 5. TEPIC investors were the marginal investors in UK resident stocks quoted on the
LSE prior to the removal of the tax credit for such investment on the 2nd July 1997.
As a result BOTHβ  is significantly greater than zero in the UK models, but IRISHβ  is
not.
4.2.  Clustering
To control for potential effects of UK resident companies’ shares going ex-dividend on the same days,
i.e., concern that residuals may not be independently and identically distributed, the UK model
estimations were repeated using portfolios of stocks grouped on the basis of their ex-dividend day.
The results do not differ substantially from those set out in the next section.  Therefore, in the interests
of economy, they are not separately reported in full, but differences from the main reported results are
disclosed by way of footnote. 11  Concerning dividend events of Irish registered companies, 70 of our
sample of 98 events (71%) occurred on days absent any other sample dividend events; and only 28 of
our sample of events (29%) occurred on days on which there was one or more other sample dividend
event.  Therefore, re-estimation of the Irish models to allow for clustering was not considered
necessary.
4.3.  Trading behaviour
As discussed above, trading volumes are expected to be higher around the ex-dividend day, as tax-
privileged investors purchase the shares cum-dividend and sell ex-dividend.  Similar to Michaely and
Vila (1995) and Li (2002), we compute the excess trading volume on days –5 to +5 around the ex-
dividend day, EVi,t, as follows:
period estimation duringday per   tradedstock in  shares of no. average
day on   tradedstock in  shares ofnumber 
i
ti
(12)
where [ ]5,5 +−∈t  in terms of days relative to the ex-dividend day. We adopt an estimation period of
–105 to –6 days relative to the ex-dividend day.
Partitioning the sample by Irish versus UK residence, and the Irish sample by four tax regime periods
and the UK sample by three, we calculate average excess volumes as follows:
                                                 
11 These results are available from the authors.
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where [ ]5,5 +−∈t , relative to the ex-dividend day, and nt is the number of ex-dividend day
observations during the tax regime concerned during ‘relative’ day t during the test period.
We also calculate the significance with which we may infer that the mean trading volume during the
test period exceeds that during the estimation period (t-test on difference in means, one tailed test) for
each dividend event, and, again partitioning the sample as above, calculate the proportions of each
sub-sample in which such significance is below the 50%, 10%, 5%, 2.5% and 1% levels.  We then
compare proportions over tax regime of, separately, Irish and UK resident companies.
As the extent of tax-heterogeneity was greater for both Irish and UK resident stocks prior to the
removal of the tax credit, we would expect excess trading to be greater during that period.  In
particular, during the period 2nd July 1997 to 31st December 1998 not only was there tax-heterogeneity
based on investors’ tax positions, but the ability of investors in Irish resident companies still to reclaim
dividend tax credits meant there was tax-heterogeneity based on the residency of the companies.  We
would expect, as a result, that the volume of shares traded in Irish resident stocks to be greater during
this period; and greatest, during the period 2nd July 1997 to 2nd December 1997 while the rate of Irish
dividend tax credit remained at 21%.  Hence the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6. The number of shares traded in Irish resident stocks quoted on the LSE around
dividend events was higher during the period prior to 2nd July 1997 than it was after
the 31st December 1998, and highest during the period 2nd July 1997 to the 31st
December, 1998 – consistent with TEPIC investors changing their portfolios in
order to capture the preferential treatment with respect to the tax credit afforded to
investors in Irish resident companies.
Hypothesis 7. The number of shares traded in Irish resident stocks quoted on the LSE around
dividend events was higher during the period prior to 2nd July 1997 than it was after
2nd December 1997, and highest during the period 2nd July 1997 to 2nd December,
1997 – consistent with TEPIC investors changing their portfolios in order to
capture the preferential treatment with respect to the tax credit at 21% afforded to
investors in Irish resident companies.
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Hypothesis 8. The number of shares traded in UK resident stocks quoted on the LSE around
dividend events was higher prior to 2nd July 1997 than it was after this date -
consistent with higher tax heterogeneity.
4.4.  Data
The data source for this study was Datastream.  Datastream list FTAL99 (list of FTSE All Share Index
constituents in 1999) yielded 811 UK firms listed on the LSE in 1999; and Datastream list FLON (all
non-UK-registered firms listed on the LSE) together with list DEADIR (‘dead’ Irish firms) yielded 57
Irish registered, LSE listed firms.  Starting with the population of all these firms’ dividend events
during the period 1996 to 1999 (inclusive), reductions were made for ‘unusable events’ as per Table 2
to give a useable sample of 4,028 UK resident company dividend events and 193 Irish resident
company dividend events with ex-dividend date during the period 1 January 1996 to 31 December
1999 for which share price data were available from 105 days prior to the ex-dividend date through to
the ex-dividend date.
To avoid problems associated with thin trading of company shares, and following Bell and Jenkinson,
who point out that although no price change is observed if there is no trade on the ex-dividend day the
price might change when the share is traded later, it is appropriate to include in the DOR and
regression analyses only dividend events where the stock was traded on the ex-dividend day.
Therefore, we exclude dividend events where there was no share price change on the ex-dividend day.
Finally, we exclude from the samples dividend events where the declaration and payment dates
straddle changes in availability in dividend tax credit repayment to TEPIC investors, i.e. dividends
declared by Irish or UK resident firms before 2nd July 1997 and paid on or after that date, and
dividends declared by Irish resident firms up to and including 31st December 1998 and paid after that
date.  As per Table 2, this results in samples of 3,596 UK resident company dividend events and 98
Irish resident company dividend events for which analyses of basic statistics, DOR and regression
estimation are performed.
Trading volumes data were also collected for the period 105 days prior to and 5 days following the ex-
dividend day where such data were available from our Datastream source, yielding samples of 2,955
UK resident company dividend events and 70 Irish resident company dividend events for which
analysis of trading volume is performed (see Table 2).
The number of Irish resident company dividend events in our sample is, therefore, modest, particularly
in period Irish21, with potential implications for the level of significance of the relationships that we
hypothesise and seek.  It is important to note, however, that our samples are based on the population of
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all LSE-listed UK and Irish resident firms’ dividend events with an ex-dividend date between 1
January 1996 and 31 December 1999, with sample reduction owing only to methodological necessity
and data availability.
Since tax treatment of dividend and, in particular, availability and rate of associated tax credit re-
claim, depend upon the date the dividend was paid (rather than, for example, the date it was declared
or approved), our sample dividend events are assigned to periods (Both, Irish21, Irish11 or Neither for
Irish resident companies’ dividends, and Both, Irish or Neither for UK resident companies’ dividend
events) based on payment date.
5.  Empirical results
5.1.  Basic statistics
The basic statistics for the samples analysed are presented in Table 3.  The mean DOR for Irish
resident stocks (Table 3, Panel A) rises from 0.152 during period Both to 3.480 during period Irish21;
then falls during period Irish11 to 0.177, a level similar to that seen in period Both; and finally rises in
period Neither to 0.900.  This is consistent with our fourth hypothesis, that TEPIC investors were not
normally the marginal investors in Irish resident stocks quoted on the UK Stock Exchange prior to 2nd
July 1997or after 2nd December 1997, but were the marginal investors during the period 2nd July 1997
to 2nd December, 1997, in order to capture the preferential treatment, with respect to the tax credit at
21%, afforded to investment in Irish resident companies.  Testing the changes in DOR using both a
parametric test (analysis of differences in means) and a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon Mann Whitney
test) (Table 4, Panel A), we find strong support for this hypothesis.  Under difference of means testing,
the change between periods Both and Irish21 is significant at the 5% level; that between Irish2112 and
Irish11 at 1%; and the change between periods Irish11 and Neither is not significant.  The respective
significances via Wilcoxon Mann Whitney testing are 1%, 5% and insignificant.
The mean DOR is greatest for UK resident companies (Table 3, Panel B) when the tax-credit is
available, falling slightly from 0.774 in period Both to 0.763 in period Irish, and falling again to 0.435
in period Neither.  This lends some support to our fifth hypothesis (above), although the fall in DOR
between periods Both and Irish is lower than expected. Our results as between periods Both and
Neither are in agreement with those of Bell and Jenkinson, who argue that, since the only group of
investors affected by the removal of the tax credit were tax-exempt investors, a significant change in
                                                 
12 To determine whether the companies paying a dividend during the period Irish 21 accelerated their dividend
payment to take advantage of the higher tax credit we compared the month in which the dividend was paid to the
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the DOR suggests that the marginal investors in UK resident companies were tax-exempt.  The level
of DOR during period Irish under this analysis, however, prevents a clear-cut conclusion.  The
methodological issues in using the ‘raw’ DOR are, however, as discussed above.  We move on below
to regression analysis as used to identify an implied DOR from slope coefficients.
5.2.  Regression analysis
The results of the OLS estimations along with diagnostic statistics are summarised in Tables 5 and 6.
The residuals of the unscaled models (Table 5) and scaled models (Table 6) exhibit high levels of non-
normality.  Non-normality in the distribution of the residuals can be as a result of non-normality in the
dependent variable (Rawlings, 1988).  In our data the main form of departure from non-normality is
kurtosis, specifically the residuals are lepyokurtic or peaked.13  Whilst it can be argued that with a
sufficiently large sample size this should not be a cause for concern, we assess the sensitivity of the
reported results by employing a transformation of the dependent variable.  In order to ‘broaden’ the
distribution we employ a cube root transformation of the dependent variable (Rawlings, 1988).
Though the Jarque-Bera statistic is still significant in two of the models, the transformation has the
desired effect of significantly reducing the level of the diagnostic statistic in all four models.14  The
reported Breusch-Pagan test statistics indicate significant departures from the assumption of
homoscedastic variances in both the UK unscaled and scaled models, consequently, the reported t-
statistics incorporate the White (1980) adjustment.  The sensitivity of the models to the presences of
influential observations has been assessed using the DEFITS statistic (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch,
1980), which suggests that the reported results are not sensitive to the inclusion of influential
observations.15
The results of estimation of the unscaled Irish and UK models are summarised in Table 5.  The
coefficient 1β , at 0.7759, is significantly greater than 0 and is not significantly less than one.  This
coefficient represents the implied DOR in respect of UK resident companies’ dividends in the model’s
                                                                                                                                                         
month the dividend was paid in the subsequent year.  The same month was used for the payment of both
dividends.
13 For the sample of UK firms, kurtosis statistics of 135.230 and 24.273 occurred in the unscaled and scaled
measures of the dependent variable respectively.  The issue was less problematic in the Irish sample, where the
corresponding figures were 2.573 and 5.952 respectively.
14 The two significant test statistics occur: (i) in the unscaled Irish model (6.168 compared with 43.04 in the
absence of the transformation); and (ii) in the scaled UK model (134.176 compared with >77,363 in the absence
of the transformation).  Since each of the four transformed models is qualitatively identical to its corresponding
untransformed model, in the interests of economy we report only the untransformed models.  Full results are
available for the authors.
15 Observations with a DEFITS statistics in excess of the critical level were excluded and the model reestimated.
In each of the four models the results are qualitatively identical to those reported in Tables 5 and 6 and are not,
therefore, reported separately.  Full results are available from the authors.  The critical value is calculated as
np×2 , where p is the number of independent variables plus one, and n is the number of observations (Belsley
et al., 1980).
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‘base case’, i.e., the period following removal of entitlement by TEPIC investors to tax credit
repayment.  Coefficient BOTHβ , at 0.4241, is positive and significant, leading to an implied DOR of
1.200 (being the sum of coefficients 1β  and BOTHβ ) in respect of UK resident companies’ dividend
prior to the removal of the dividend tax credit.  Coefficient IRISHβ  in this estimated model is positive,
but insignificant.  Although the sign of the intercept is negative as hypothesised, it is not statistically
significant at accepted levels.  The implied DOR at 1.200, greater than the 1.069 reported by Bell and
Jenkinson for the large companies in their sample, is still below the theoretical figure of 1.25 which
would be expected, absent transactions costs, during a period when the marginal investor was able to
reclaim the tax credit and that rate of tax credit on gross dividend was 20% - as was the case during
period Both.16  Overall, therefore, we deduce support for Hypothesis 5, i.e., that TEPIC investors were
the marginal investors in UK resident stocks quoted on the LSE prior to the removal of the tax credit
for such investment on the 2nd July 1997
The results of the unscaled Irish model can be summarised as follows: the coefficient 1β  is
significantly greater than zero, but not significantly less than one, and implies a DOR in respect of
Irish resident companies’ dividends of 0.7955 following removal of entitlement by TEPIC investors to
tax credit repayment.  Coefficients BOTHβ  and 11IRISHβ  are both negative but insignificant.
Coefficient 21IRISHβ , at 2.1796, is positive and significant, providing further support of Hypothesis 4
in confirmation of our results from analysis of ‘basic statistics’ above; and lending no support to
alternative Hypotheses 1, 2 or 3, each of which requires at least one of BOTHβ  and 11IRISHβ  to be
positive and significant. The estimated intercept for the unscaled Irish model is of the expected
(negative) sign, but is insignificant.
As reported in Table 6, estimation of the scaled UK model confirms the qualitative results from
estimation of the unscaled UK model (above): the coefficient 1β  on net dividend at 0.8869 is both
significantly greater than zero and significantly less than one, and is and is close to the DOR of 0.867
reported by Bell and Jenkinson for the largest 250 companies in their sample.  Coefficient BOTHβ , at
0.1003 is positive and significant.  In this model the implied DOR is 0.967 (again, being the sum of
coefficients 1β  and BOTHβ ) in respect of UK resident companies’ dividend prior to the removal of the
                                                 
16 Re-estimation of the unscaled UK model based on unadjusted (i.e., not market adjusted) prices gave
qualitatively similar results.  The only difference was coefficient IRISHβ  being significant at the 1% level (cf.
not significant above).  Re-estimation of the unscaled UK model to allow for clustering also gave qualitatively
similar results.  The only differences was coefficient IRISHβ  being significant at the 5% level (cf. not significant
above).
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dividend tax credit.  Coefficient IRISHβ , is not statistically significant at normally accepted levels; and
the intercept is of the hypothesised (negative) sign and statistically significant implying the presence
of market microstructure effects on ex-dividend prices.17  The scaled Irish model provides no
explanatory power, (having an adjusted R2 statistic of zero), however the lack of power is sensitive to
the exclusion of influential observations.18
5.3.  Trading volume
Michaely and Vila (1995) argue that trading volume is positively related to tax-induced heterogeneity
in stock ownership.  Prior to the removal of the tax credit, there was a higher degree of tax
heterogeneity as dividends were of a substantially different value to tax-exempt investors than to
others due to the tax credit.  Therefore, we would expect a higher trading volume prior to the removal
of the tax credit.  If TEPIC investors, in order to capture a tax credit, were temporarily purchasing
Irish resident stocks cum-dividend and then selling the stocks ex-dividend during the period 2nd July
1997 to 31st December 1998 (inclusive), we would expect to observe a high trading volume in such
stocks over this period.  Alternatively, if such dividend capture activity were restricted to the period
when the dividend tax credit associated with Irish resident stocks’ dividends was 21%, we would
expect to observe a high trading volume in the period 2nd July 1997 to 2nd December 1997 (inclusive)
only.  During these periods there was not only a high degree of tax heterogeneity among investors but
also a high degree of tax heterogeneity among stocks.  Hypotheses 6 and 7 (above) pertain.  Similarly,
in respect of UK resident stocks, Hypothesis 8 (above) predicts a higher trading volume before
removal of the right of TEPIC investors to re-claim dividend tax credit.
For Irish resident stocks, Table 7 Panel A suggests that, contrary to expectations, although positive
abnormal trading volume occurred during each of the periods, it was highest during period Neither and
lowest during period Irish21.  It was expected that the highest abnormal trading volume would occur
prior to the removal of the tax credit (when there was a higher degree of tax-heterogeneity), whereas
the highest abnormal trading volume actually occurred after the removal of the tax credit.  Foregoing
discussion of the net value of the differential tax treatment, subsuming transactions and portfolio
adjustment costs, pertains.  Li (2002) also reports results for the US which contradict expectations
since highest excess trading volume occurred when tax heterogeneity was at its lowest.  Also in line
                                                 
17 Re-estimation of the scaled UK model based on unadjusted (i.e., not market adjusted) prices gave qualitatively
similar results.  The only differences were: (i) coefficient BOTHβ  was not significant (cf. 5% above); and (ii)
coefficient IRISHβ  was significant at the 5% level (cf. not significant above).  Re-estimation of the scaled UK
model to allow for clustering by using portfolios of stocks grouped on the basis of their ex-dividend day also
gave qualitatively similar results.  The only difference was the intercept not being significant (cf. significant
above).
18 The scaled Irish model was marginally significant when estimated after excluding influential observations
(refer Footnote 15 above), in particular the coefficient on the Irish21 variable was significant at the 2.5% level.
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with Li, we find that dividend yield is at its lowest when tax heterogeneity is at its highest.  Li suggests
that companies may have decreased their dividend yield in line with the tax changes which increased
investors’ preferences for capital gains.  The nature of the tax heterogeneity in our study is that
dividends are preferred over capital gains by some investors, hence, if managers reacted in a consistent
manner to the companies in Li’s study, they would have increased their dividend yield rather than
decreased it. 19
The results for UK resident stocks are, again, contrary to expectations.  Our results, summarised in
Panel B of Table 7, fail to support Hypothesis 8.  Trading volume was at its highest when tax
heterogeneity was at its lowest.  The magnitude of the excess volume for the time periods Neither and
Both are surprisingly similar for the UK and Irish resident firms – which suggests the question as to
whether or not there are other reasons why trading volume around ex-dividend dates has increased.
Table 8.1 shows the number and proportion of dividend events (split by Irish versus UK resident, and
by time periods) for which trading around the ex-dividend day exceeds that in the estimation period at
significance levels of 50%, 10%, 5%, 2.5% and 1%.  Concentrating upon the proportion in each case
where significance of 10% or less is achieved, in respect of Irish resident stocks we observe, as
expected from earlier results and in line with Hypothesis 7, a rise from period Both to period Irish21
and a fall from period Irish21 to period Irish11; but an unexpected rise from period Irish11 to period
Neither.  None of these changes, however, is statistically significant at generally acceptable levels.  In
respect of UK resident stocks, we observe little difference in proportions between the different time
periods, and thus have little support for Hypothesis 8.
Propensity to capture dividends is related, in earlier work, to dividend yield (for example, Lakonishok
and Vermaelen, 1986 and Bell and Jenkinson, 2002).  Therefore, we consider only the half samples for
which the dividend yield is greatest, in Table 8.2.  For UK resident stocks, we now see, as
hypothesised, a fall off in the proportion of dividend events for which there is 10% significance or less
of excess trading volume around ex-dividend days – between period Both and each of periods Irish
and Neither (although the drops are not significant).  Comparing Table 8.1 Panel B with Table 8.2
Panel B, we observe an increase in the proportion with significant excess volume with increasing
dividend yield except in time period Neither, which is as expected.
For Irish resident stocks, however, sample size considerations prevent meaningful comment upon
changes in the proportion.  Comparing Table 8.1 Panel A with Table 8.2 Panel A, of particular
interest, however, is the fall off in the raw numbers of relatively high dividend yield dividends (i.e. top
                                                 
19 Increases in dividend yield may not be attractive, however, if they lead to subsequent decreases and
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half in terms of dividend yield) from Irish resident firms as between period Both and each of periods
Irish and Neither (which may certainly, to some extent, explain the foregoing).
5.4.  Results discussion and extension
The inference from our results that TEPIC investors did seek to capture the dividends from Irish
resident companies when the rate of tax credit was 21%, but not when it was 11% suggests a simple
calculation of bounds for the rate of overall transactions and portfolio restructuring costs as expected
by TEPIC investors in Irish resident stocks on the LSE.  Consider an investor who is considering
investing an amount I in an Irish resident stock cum-dividend in order to capture the dividend tax
credit; and assume that total expected transactions and portfolio restructuring costs are viewed by the
investor as a percentage, t, of I.  Then, from our finding above, we suggest:
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where p represents the market price per share cum-dividend, d is the rate of dividend per share; and the
left-most and right-most terms of the inequality represent the value of tax credit captured for an
amount I invested cum-dividend where the dividend tax credit rate is, respectively, 21% and 11%.
Expression (14) simplifies to:
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where Y represents the rate of dividend yield based on cum-dividend market price.
Expression (15) may be generalised to allow for any percentage rate of tax credit, r, as follows, to give
a general rule, under this analysis, for expected value adding tax credit capture:
t
r
r
Y >
−100
(16)
One implication of this expression is that investment activity undertaken in order to capture dividend
tax credits be restricted to stocks with high dividend yield, consistent with the discussions and
analyses of Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), Bell and Jenkinson (2002), and others.  This,
                                                                                                                                                         
accompanying signalling costs.
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therefore, speaks further for the results obtained above, given the heterogeneity with respect to
dividend yield in each of our sub-period samples.
We turn to approximating the level of total transactions and portfolio restructuring costs implied by
our data.  We consider dividend events of UK and Irish resident companies during period Both
together with dividend events of Irish resident companies during periods Irish21 and Irish11 (i.e. all
those events which may be subject to tax credit-related dividend capture).  Dividend events where the
market-adjusted DOR is less than 0.5 or greater than 1.5 are removed as outliers where non-tax credit
factors are clearly at work20, leaving a sample of 471 dividend events from UK and Irish resident
companies.  For each dividend event in this sample, the value of yield grossed up for dividend tax
credit, i.e. 
r
r
Y
−100
, was calculated.  The sample was then divided into two: sub-sample A, containing
dividend events for which the grossed-up yield was greater than or equal to some value, x; and sub-
sample B containing dividend events for which the grossed-up yield was less than x: this for x ranging
from 0.5% to 4.0% in increments of 0.1% (i.e., the sample was divided int0 two samples in 26
different ways).  Given that higher DOR indicates a higher propensity to dividend capture, we
consider the significance with which we may conclude that the mean DOR in sub-sample A exceeds
that of sub-sample B over the range of x (see Figure 1) and seek the value(s) of x where a clear
separation is apparent.  From Figure 1, it is clear that there is no such significance at generally
acceptable levels for values of x up to and including 2.3%; and that significance at generally
acceptable levels appears for x greater than 2.4% (with exceptions when x is 3.0, 3.2 and 3.3%).
Minimum significance (at the 0.3% level) is achieved when x is 2.6%.  Therefore, from expression
(16) we conclude that overall expected transactions and portfolio adjustment costs are in the order of
2.6%.  This is significantly higher than the ‘round trip’ transactions costs suggested by James (2000);
and implies that expected portfolio adjustment costs are in the order of 0.8%.  This is consistent with
the expected costs of deviation from an otherwise optimal portfolio for the purposes of dividend (and
related tax credit) capture being significant; uncertainty over ex-dividend price, and the efficacy of
anti-avoidance legislation which requires a stock to be held for at least a month for dividend tax credit
capture to be fully effective.
6.  Summary and conclusions
Using both price and trading volume data, we examine the market valuation of dividends from Irish
and UK resident companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and the propensity of investors to
capture those dividends, over the distinct contiguous phases of a ‘natural experiment’ – during which
                                                 
20 The minimum DOR expected when abstracting from all factors other than dividend tax credit would be 0.6
(assuming the UK higher rate of personal taxation at 40%); and the maximum DOR expected would be 1.3
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the availability of dividend tax credit repayment to UK pension funds and UK insurance company tax
exempt pension businesses (TEPIC investors) was changed.  Our samples are based on the population
of all LSE-listed UK and Irish resident firms’ dividend events with an ex-dividend date between 1
January 1996 and 31 December 1999, with sample reduction owing only to methodological necessity
and data availability.
The Irish data confirm that TEPIC investors were, in the main, the marginal investors in Irish resident
stocks around ex-dividend days where there was the entitlement to re-claim a dividend tax credit at
21% of gross dividend from such stocks, but not where the tax credit rate was either 11% or there was
an entitlement to re-claim a dividend tax credit from UK resident stocks.  The data in respect of UK
resident companies confirms the results of Bell and Jenkinson – that the marginal investors were, in
the main, TEPIC investors, and that the DOR dropped significantly following the removal of the tax
credit upon UK company dividends – albeit there is some evidence of continued preference amongst
investors for dividends despite the removal of the tax credit motivation.  This continuing preference
will reduce the effectiveness of the abolition of tax credit repayments in achieving one of its stated
aims, the reduction in the pressure on companies to pay dividends to institutional shareholders.21
The results of Michaely and Vila (1996) and are also supported by data upon the UK stocks in that
trading volumes were significantly higher during the period of greater tax-heterogeneity.  Also, as
suggested by Michaely and Vila, the extent of abnormal trading volume increases with increases in
dividend yield.  Trading volume analysis upon the Irish stocks, owing to sample size constraints, is
able neither to confirm nor contradict the regression results.
By analysis of dividend yield and available tax credit repayment, we deduce an estimated average
level for total expected transactions and portfolio restructuring costs to be in the region of 2.6% of
amount invested.  We also find that dividend capture is sometimes effected when it appears, under this
analysis, to be not worthwhile; and, conversely, that dividend capture is sometimes foregone when it
appears, under the same analysis, to be worthwhile.  This is consistent with the existence of firm-
specific investment considerations, and investor-specific expectations as regards increasing risks
arising as a result of moving from an otherwise optimal portfolios and trading transactions costs.  It is
also consistent with investors maximizing after tax return, rather than on maximising specific taxation
effects.
                                                                                                                                                         
(assuming full tax credit availability to tax exempt investors).  The cut offs used are slightly wider than these
theoretical bounds.
21 Discussions with the Chief Executive Office of a UK listed company confirm that post abolition institutional
investors funds still ‘state’ their dividend requirements.  This is particularly the case in periods of falling stock
market prices when fund investors require income in the absence of significant gains.
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 Table 1
 Ireland and UK: tax credit rates on dividends and availability of tax credit repayment to tax exempt investors
Panel A:  Rates of tax credit on dividends
Percentage rate of tax credit as applicable to gross dividend
 Period
Republic of .Ireland UK
 6th April 1995 to 5th April 1996 (inclusive) 23 20
 6th April 1996 to 5th April 1997 (inclusive) 23 20
 6th April 1997 to 2nd December 1997 (inclusive) 21 20
 3rd December 1997 to 5th April 1998 (inclusive) 11 20
 6th April 1998 to 5th April 1999 (inclusive) 11 20
 After 5th April 1999 0 10
Panel B:  Availability of tax credit repayment to tax exempt investors
 UK firms' dividends
 Repayment available up to and including 1 July 1997; not on or after
2 July 1997
 Republic of Ireland firms' dividends
 Repayment available up to and including 31 December 1998; not on
or after 1 January 1999
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 Table 2
 Sample selection
  UK resident sample Irish resident sample
 Source
Datastream list
FTAL99 (list of
FTSE All Share
Index constituents
in 1999)
Datastream lists
FLON (all non-UK-
registered firms listed
on the LSE) and
DEADIR (dead Irish
firms) *
 Number of firms 811 57
 Dividend observations with ex-dividend date between 1/1/96 and
31/12/99
5,412 216
 LESS (population reduced with steps in the following order):   
 dividends from UK-registered companies paid gross 10 0
 dividends from UK-registered companies paid in other than £ 8 0
 
dividend observations where a firm is ex-dividend in respect of
more than one dividend on a single day
265 2
 dividends specified as "foreign income dividend" 281 0
 dividends specified as "special" 29 1
 
dividends from investment funds and similar (e.g. investment
trusts)
791 0
 
dividends around whose ex-dividend dates historic prices are not
available
0 16
 
dividends from Irish-registered companies whose London prices
are not quoted in £
0 4
 Sub-total 4,028 193
 LESS: dividend events where there was no share price change on the
ex-dividend day or where the declaration and payment dates
straddle changes in availability in dividend tax credit repayment to
TEPIC investors
432 95
 Number of dividend observations in sample for price behaviour 3,596 98
 OF WHICH: dividend events in respect of which there is sufficient
volume data available from our data source to allow trading
volume analysis
2,955 70
 * Lists as at 28 October 2002, in each case extracting companies where field GEOGC = "IR" and field
EXNAME = "LONDON".
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Irish stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange
Period
Number of dividend events
All
(98)
Both
(29)
Irish 21
(8)
Irish 11
(31)
Neither
(30)
Cum-div price mean
median
st. dev
255.2
179.3
191.6
243.8
180.0
177.2
218.9
160.5
181.4
249.1
190.0
180.1
282.1
201.8
222.9
Net dividend mean
median
st. dev
2.689
2.223
2.080
2.827
2.386
2.149
1.472
0.932
1.316
2.389
1.735
1.922
3.189
2.610
2.235
Adjusted price drop mean
median
st. dev
1.663
1.617
4.952
1.09
1.11
6.11
4.82
4.44
4.25
0.565
1.697
4.792
2.512
1.524
3.572
Dividend yield mean
median
st. dev
0.012
0.011
0.006
0.013
0.012
0.006
0.007
0.006
0.002
0.010
0.009
0.005
0.014
0.012
0.007
Price drop ratio (DOR) mean
median
st. dev
0.661
0.765
3.358
0.152
0.677
2.868
3.480
2.390
3.430
0.177
0.876
4.616
0.900
0.623
1.457
(P0-P1)/P0 mean
median
st. dev
0.007
0.010
0.025
0.006
0.012
0.026
0.020
0.016
0.022
0.002
0.008
0.032
0.009
0.009
0.014
Panel B: UK stocks listed on the London stock exchange
Period
Number of dividend events
All
(3596)
Both
(1212)
Irish
(1181)
Neither
(1203)
Cum-div price mean
median
st. dev
421.24
321.25
391.11
399.61
320.00
335.06
433.5
320.0
419.3
431.0
323.0
413.6
Net dividend mean
median
st. dev
5.332
3.900
5.087
5.250
3.780
4.733
5.139
3.800
4.967
5.603
4.000
5.522
Adjusted price drop mean
median
st. dev
4.236
2.978
14.595
4.839
3.263
13.881
4.239
2.844
14.664
3.626
2.734
15.204
Dividend yield mean
median
st. dev
0.015
0.013
0.011
0.015
0.013
0.008
0.014
0.012
0.009
0.016
0.013
0.015
Price drop ratio (DOR) mean
median
st. dev
0.657
0.873
4.850
0.774
0.920
2.437
0.763
0.873
5.901
0.435
0.823
5.487
(P0-P1)/P0 mean
median
st. dev
0.012
0.012
0.024
0.012
0.012
0.021
0.012
0.012
0.024
0.011
0.011
0.026
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Table 4
Significance of difference between the drop-off ratio as between sub-
period samples
Panel A: Irish stocks listed on the London stock exchange
t-statistic Wilcoxon Mann
Whitney sig. level
Irish 21 with Both  (1-tail) 2.52 ** 0.003 **
Irish 11 with Both (2-tail) 0.03 0.801
Neither with Both (2-tail) 1.26 0.994
Irish 11 with Irish21 (1-tail) -2.25 * 0.014 *
Neither with Irish21 (1-tail) -2.08 * 0.005 **
Neither with Irish11 (2-tail) 0.83 0.846
Panel B: UK stocks listed on the London stock exchange
t-statistic Wilcoxon Mann
Whitney sig. level
Irish with Both  (1-tail) -0.06 0.085
Both with neither  (1-tail) -1.96 * 0.001 **
Irish with Neither  (2-tail) -1.41 0.072
*, ** indicate significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively (one or two-tailed tests as
appropriate).
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Table 5
Regression estimation results
Irish model: εβββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=− DIRISHDIRISHDBOTHDPP IRISHIRISHBOTH 1121 11211010
UK model: εββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=− DIRISHDBOTHDPP IRISHBOTH1010
where Po and P1 are, respectively, the cum-dividend and the ex-dividend share price; D is net dividend; BOTH
is a dummy variable, being 1 when the ex-dividend day occurred prior to 2 July 1997 and 0 otherwise;
IRISH21 is a zero-one dummy, equal to one when the ex-dividend day falls in the period from 2nd July, 1997 to
2nd December 1997 (inclusive); and IRISH11 is a zero-one dummy, equal to one when the ex-dividend day
falls in the period from 3rd December 1997 to 31st December 1998 (inclusive); and IRISH is a dummy variable,
being when the ex-dividend day occurred between the 2 July 1997 and 31 December 1998 (inclusive) and 0
otherwise.  The t-statistics are in parentheses and indicate whether the coefficient is different to zero for all the
variables (in the UK sample the difference between the coefficient 1β  and one is not significant at acceptable
levels of significance: t-statistic = 1.648; the corresponding coefficient in the Irish sample is not significantly
different from one: t-statistic = 0.744).
Irish resident stocks UK resident stocks
D ( 1β )
0.7955
(2.893***)
0.7759
(5.705***)
DBOTH ⋅ ( BOTHβ )
-0.1194
(-0.363)
0.4241
(2.027**)
DIRISH ⋅ ( IRISHβ ) N/A
0.1404
(0.991)
DIRISH ⋅21 ( 21IRISHβ )
2.1796
(2.435***)
N/A
DIRISH ⋅11 ( 11IRISHβ )
-0.4977
(-1.413)
N/A
Intercept ( 0β )
-0.2623
(-0.335)
-0.8878
(-1.562)
Number of observations 98 3,596
R2 (adjusted) 12.1% 11.4%
F-statistic
4.324 ***
(4 ,93)
155.818 ***
(3, 3592)
Breusch-Pagan
7.121
(4)
5,229.144 ***
(3)
Jarque-Bera ~ ( )22χ 43.038 *** >100,000 ***
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 5%, 2.5% and 1% respectively, White (1980) adjusted where appropriate (one or
two-tailed tests as appropriate)
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Table 6
Regression estimation results
Irish model: εβββββ +++++=
−
0
11
0
21
00
10
0
10 1121
P
D
IRISH
P
D
IRISH
P
D
BOTH
P
D
P
PP
IRISHIRISHBOTH
UK model: εββββ ++++=
−
000
10
0
10
P
D
IRISH
P
D
BOTH
P
D
P
PP
IRISHBOTH
where Po and P1 are, respectively, the cum-dividend and the ex-dividend share price; D is net dividend; BOTH
is a dummy variable, being 1 when the ex-dividend day occurred prior to 2 July 1997 and 0 otherwise;
IRISH21 is a zero-one dummy, equal to one when the ex-dividend day falls in the period from 2nd July, 1997 to
2nd December 1997 (inclusive); and IRISH11 is a zero-one dummy, equal to one when the ex-dividend day
falls in the period from 3rd December 1997 to 31st December 1998 (inclusive); and IRISH is a dummy variable,
being when the ex-dividend day occurred between the 2 July 1997 and 31 December 1998 (inclusive) and 0
otherwise .  The t-statistics are in parentheses and indicate whether the coefficient is different to zero for all the
variables (in the UK sample the difference between the coefficient 1β  and one is significant at the 1% level: t-
statistic = 2.701; the corresponding coefficient in the Irish sample is not significantly different from one: t-
statistic = 1.341).
Irish resident stocks UK resident stocks
0P
D
( 1β )
0.3717
(0.793)
0.8869
(21.18***)
0P
D
BOTH ( BOTHβ )
0.1821
(0.410)
0.1003
(1.674*)
0P
D
IRISH ( IRISHβ ) N/A
0.0699
(1.492)
0
21
P
D
IRISH ( 21IRISHβ )
1.7662
(1.267) N/A
0
11
P
D
IRISH ( 11IRISHβ )
0.0163
(0.031)
N/A
Intercept ( 0β )
0.0005
(0.087)
-0.0023
(-3.189***)
Number of observations 98 3,596
R2 (adjusted) 0.0% 19.2%
F-statistic
0.591
(4, 93)
285.376 ***
(3, 3592)
Breusch-Pagan
8.559
(4)
19.678 ***
(3)
Jarque-Bera ~ ( )22χ 164.728 *** 77,363.33 ***
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 5%, 2.5% and 1% respectively, White (1980) adjusted where appropriate (one or
two-tailed tests as appropriate)
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Table 7
Mean excess trading volume around ex-dividend days*
Panel A: Irish resident stocks
Period
Day Both Irish21 Irish11 Neither
-5 0.349 2.521 -0.192 0.483
-4 0.543 -0.401 -0.587 0.234
-3 -0.130 -0.784 1.522 0.280
-2 0.508 -0.353 0.282 0.936
-1 1.187 0.143 -0.594 0.143
0 1.095 0.507 0.707 -0.084
1 -0.367 -0.224 0.671 0.188
2 -0.375 0.566 0.649 -0.440
3 -0.144 -0.458 0.596 2.030
4 1.333 -0.635 0.529 0.556
5 0.128 -0.548 -0.410 3.873
Total 4.127 0.334 3.173 8.199
Panel B: UK resident stocks
Period
Day Both Irish Neither
-5 0.194 0.328 1.026
-4 0.727 0.841 1.732
-3 0.471 0.684 1.047
-2 0.510 0.638 0.832
-1 0.368 0.374 0.596
0 0.246 0.172 0.489
1 0.352 0.331 0.297
2 0.465 0.287 0.730
3 0.434 0.225 0.697
4 0.185 0.372 0.473
5 0.138 0.014 0.427
Total 4.091 4.267 8.347
 * Excess trading volume is calculated for days –5 to +5 around the ex-dividend day, EVi,t, as:
period estimation duringday per   tradedstock in  shares of no. average
day on   tradedstock in  shares ofnumber 
i
ti
   where [ ]5,5 +−∈t  in terms of days relative to the ex-dividend day, and the estimation period is the period –105 to –6
   relative to the ex-dividend day.  Partitioning the sample by Irish versus UK residence, and by the three tax regime periods,
   average excess volumes are calculated as ∑
=
=
tn
i
ti
t
t EVn
EV
1
,
__ 1 where [ ]5,5 +−∈t , relative to the ex-dividend day, and nt is
   the number of ex-dividend day observations during the tax regime concerned during ‘relative’ day t during the test period.
 The figures in bold indicate that the mean excess volume was significantly greater than the average volume traded over the
   estimation period, at least 5% significance.  The standard errors over the estimation period for Irish resident companies were
   0.646, 0.723, 0.588 and 0.691 for the Both, Irish21, Irish11 and Neither periods, respectively.  The standard errors over the
   estimation period for the UK resident companies were 0.114, 0.117 and 0.115 for the Both, Irish and Neither periods,
   respectively.
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 Table 8
 Proportion of sample firms for which trading volume during the test period exceeded that in the
 estimation period at various levels of significance
 (excess volume is cumulated over the period –5 to +5 days around the ex-dividend day)
 Table 8.1 – All dividend events
Panel A:  Irish resident stocks
Period
Both Irish21 Irish11 Neither
Significance Count Prop Count Prop Count Prop Count Prop
50-100% 13 0.5652 4 0.6667 14 0.7368 9 0.4091
10-50% 8 0.3478 1 0.1667 3 0.1579 8 0.3636
5-10% 0 0.0000 1 0.1667 0 0.0000 2 0.0909
95-97.5% 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 2 0.0909
1-2.5% 1 0.0435 0 0.0000 2 0.1053 0 0.0000
0-1% 1 0.0435 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 1 0.0455
0-10% 2 0.0870 1 0.1667 2 0.1053 5 0.2273
Total 23 1.0000 6 1.0000 19 1.0000 22 1.0000
Panel B:  UK resident stocks
Period
Both Irish Neither
Significance Count Prop Count Prop Count Prop
50-100% 446 0.497 459 0.540 548 0.527
10-50% 308 0.343 298 0.327 325 0.313
5-10% 51 0.057 62 0.068 55 0.053
95-97.5% 25 0.028 29 0.032 28 0.027
1-2.5% 33 0.037 35 0.038 30 0.029
0-1% 35 0.039 27 0.030 53 0.051
0-10% 144 0.160 153 0.168 166 0.160
Total 898 910
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 Table 8 (continued)
 Proportion of sample firms for which trading volume during the test period exceeded that in the
 estimation period at various level of confidence
 (excess volume is cumulated over the period –5 to +5 days around the ex-dividend day)
 Table 8.2 – Half sample of dividend events: those with the highest dividend yield
Panel A:  Irish resident stocks
Period
Both Irish21 Irish11 Neither
Significance Count Prop Count Prop Count Prop Count Prop
50-100% 9 0.750 2 0.667 7 0.700 2 0.182
10-50% 3 0.250 1 0.333 2 0.200 6 0.545
5-10% 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 2 0.182
95-97.5% 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.091
1-2.5% 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.100 0 0.000
0-1% 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
0-10% 0 0.000 0 0.000 1 0.100 3 0.273
Total 12 3 10 11
Panel B:  UK resident stocks
Period
Both Irish Neither
Significance Count Prop Count Prop Count Prop
50-100% 213 0.474 225 0.489 303 0.519
10-50% 155 0.345 154 0.335 192 0.329
5-10% 25 0.056 37 0.080 34 0.058
95-97.5% 18 0.040 13 0.028 14 0.024
1-2.5% 16 0.036 17 0.037 19 0.033
0-1% 22 0.049 14 0.030 22 0.038
0-10% 81 0.180 81 0.176 89 0.152
Total 449 460 584
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Figure 1
Sample divided into two sub-samples, each dividend event being assigned to sub-sample A if
( )rYr −100  is greater than x, and to sub-sample B if this quantity is less than x: significance with
which the hypothesis that the mean DOR for sub-sample A is greater than that for sub-sample B
for various values of x
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0%
x  (%)
Si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 (
%
),
 1
-t
ai
le
d 
te
st
